The complex interface between intellectual property law and competition law is currently under review both in the US and the EU. One field of contention is the unilateral exercise of intellectual property rights. This paper presents the different approaches recently taken by different US courts, critically reviews the ECJ's jurisprudence in the much-debated decisions Magill and IMS Health and discusses the test proposed by the EU Commission in its Discussion Paper on Exclusionary Abuses, finding that none of the approaches has addressed the problem convincingly so far. In searching for a way ahead, the paper attempts to systematize the different positions taken in the literature, contrasting in particular an "IP law approach" and a "competition law approach". It argues that a pure "IP law approach", popular in the US, is not fully applicable in the EU where IP law remains national and must respect the supremacy of the EU competition rules which must be applied uniformly in all Member States. Other theories which strive to take both IP and competition law rationales into account -e.g. Heinemann's "scope of reward"-theory -leave open the criteria on the basis of which this shall be done. The most promising approach, then, may be to shift back attention towards competition policy rationales and to focus on the concept of "contestable markets", as by Heinemann and Drexl have recently proposed. The threshold for antitrust intervention must, however, remain high. The three criteria used in the telecommunications sector to decide when regulation is justified may be of help to determine cases of legitimate intervention
Introduction
The complex interface between intellectual property law and competition law is currently under review both in the US and the EU. 1 One field of contention is the unilateral exercise of intellectual property rights (IPRs). In the US, there is disagreement between different courts of appeals on the appropriate application of the antitrust laws to unilateral refusals to license patents. 2 In the EU, two cases in which the ECJ has dealt with unilateral refusals to license intellectual property rights -Magill 3 and IMS Health 4 -are much debated and criticized. The EU Commission has proposed an approach different from both the US courts' and the ECJ's. 5 There is, therefore, cause for revisiting a debate which is led on both sides of the Atlantic, but too rarely transatlantically. 6 Do the doctrines that guide the application of other hand, is meant to keep markets open and contestable. It ensures, inter alia, that "new proprietary technologies, products and services are bought, sold, traded and licensed in a competitive environment." 11 The older view according to which competition law and IP laws are in fundamental tension, has been overcome both in the US and the EU. It was based on the perception that IPRs are essentially rights to monopoly. Today it is generally accepted that the right to exclude inherent in IPRs cannot be equated with market power of any legally relevant kind: an IPR excludes competition by imitation, but competition by substitution remains permissible. Frequently, close-enough substitutes for the protected substance matter will exist. 12 This has been stressed by the ECJ early on. 13 In the US, a Supreme Court precedent according to which a valid patent created a rebuttable presumption of market power over the patented product or process 14 was overruled in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc in 2006. 15 Relevant markets must now be defined with a view to consumer demand, and market power in the relevant market must be proved and will no longer be presumed. This approach has been adopted by the DoJ and the FTC already in 1995. 16 Significant commonalities in the US and the EU's competition law approach towards the unilateral exercise of IPRs exist also in other respects. Namely, both jurisdictions assume that the existence or mere exercise of an IPR as such cannot violate competition rules; additional factors will be needed to find an infringement of competition rules. Most instances in which the unilateral exercise of an IPR can constitute an infringement imply some type of exclusionary conduct the prohibition of which does not eliminate the essence of the exclusivity right as such. Types of conduct which are examined critically in the US like under EU competition rules include, inter alia: tying a patented product to an unpatented product, where the patent owner is dominant in the market for the patented product, and the tying practice can be used to leverage market power into a second and separate market not covered by the IPR; 17 conditional refusals to license and tradeable goods -and therefore into goods that can be subject to competition. The "reward"-rationale should therefore not be used to justify exemptions from competition. 11 DOJ/FTC, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights, 2007, p. 1. 12 Ullrich /Heinemann, 16 See DOJ/FTC, Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (Antitrust-IP Guidelines) § 2.2:
"The Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner". 17 where they cause competitive harm; 18 threatening or conducting spurious litigation for the purpose of stifling or impeding competition; or systematic acquisitions of IPRs and withholding them from third parties in order to block the ability of potential rivals to develop alternatives. The common trait of these types of conduct is the use of IPRs to maintain, strengthen or extend a dominant position.
In the US like in the EU, one of the most controversial issues in dealing with the IPantitrust interface is whether, and under what preconditions, unilateral refusals to license can infringe competition rules. The fundamental principle that each undertaking, including a dominant one, is generally free in the choice of its trading partner or in its choice not to deal at all, 19 applies both to tangible property and to IPRs. Duties to license IPRs -like duties to share physical facilities -must remain narrowly circumscribed exceptions to this fundamental principle. Despite a general tendency to liken intellectual property rights to the rights of the owners of physical property, there is a notion that limitations of the right of IPR owners to refuse to license require particular legal circumspection, since a duty to license cuts to the heart of the intellectual property right's owner's right to exclude. 20 The preconditions for finding a unilateral refusal to license to violate competition laws are controversial, however, and the approaches diverge in the US and in the EU. The following remarks shall focus on this debate.
III. Controlling unilateral refusals to license IPRs -the US experience
In the US, there is broad agreement that, as a general rule, no antitrust obligations either to use or license an IPR exist, but no consensus on how to formulate the limits to this rule. The question whether and under what specific special circumstances a unilateral refusal to license can exceptionally violate antitrust law, has become controversial in the patent and copyright context. The different approaches taken by different Circuit Courts illustrate the fundamental uncertainty in the conceptualization of the IP-antitrust interface. 23 Data General was in the business of manufacturing and reparing PCs. In an effort to increase its own share in the market for servicing its PCs, it discontinued the licensing of a copyrighted software program designed to diagnose dysfunctions of its PCs to third parties, namely to independent computer hardware repairers. When these independent organizations gained access to the software without permission, Data General sued for copyright infringement. The independent repairers counterclaimed for violation of Sec. 2 Sherman Act, alleging that the software was essential for repairing Data General's PCs. In dealing with these claims, the First Circuit dealt with the relationship between copyright law and antitrust law in depth. 24 It found that neither policy should be given primacy over the other; rather, both statutes should be interpreted in the light of each other. It therefore rejected an irrebuttable presumption that a unilateral refusal to license a copyright would be legal. On the other hand, the First Circuit emphasized the importance of preserving the system of incentives established by copyright law, even if the exercise of the rights which copyright law grants -including the refusal to license -would not always amount to an entirely "'procompetitive' [conduct] within the ordinary economic framework of the Sherman Act". 25 Also, requiring antitrust defendants to prove, in every single case in which a refusal to license a copyrighted work would come under attack, the merits of the copyright law's assumption in favor of the right to exclude would not be feasible. 26 In order to give adequate weight to both policies, the First Circuit then formulated the following rule: "[W]hile exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers". 27 In applying this rule, the First Circuit made clear that the presumption in favor of the legality of a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license an IPR is strong: it did not inquire into Data General's motivation in enforcing its copyrights; nor did it matter that Data General, by withholding the license, had reversed a prior policy. In summary, the court found no evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the unilateral refsual to deal's legality in this case. Nor did it further specify the preconditions under which the presumption could be overcome.
The 9th Circuit of Appeals had to deal with a unilateral refusal to license scenario in the famous "Kodak" case. 28 An independent service organization (ISO) had sued Kodak, Cir. 1997) alleging that Kodak had a monopoly in the parts markets for the copying machines it produced, and that its refusal to sell patented parts extended this monopoly position into the servicing of its equipment. A jury held Kodak liable under Sec. 2 Sherman Act, and the court of appeals confirmed. In doing so, the court endorsed the rebuttable presumption established by the Data General court: generally, an IPR owner will not be subject to antitrust liability when he refuses to sell or license protected work. According to the 9th Circuit, the presumption in favor of the legality had been rebutted in the Kodak case, however, because the intellectual property justification was only pretextual:
29 Kodak had referred to its IPRs only long after the fact, and of the many thousands of parts it refused to sell, only a small number was patented. 30 The IPRs were therefore apparently not the true motive for the refusal to deal. Whereas the First Circuit had refused to inquire into the motivation of the IPR owner, the 9th Circuit thus relied on the patent owner's motive or intent in refusing to license or sell to overcome the prolegality presumption.
The Federal Circuit, when confronted with a very similar fact-pattern in "Xerox", 31 rejected the 9th Circuit's approach. And while not directly challenging the 1st Circuit's rebuttable presumption in favor of the legality of refusals to license in copyright cases, it refused to apply it in a patent case. For patent cases, it established an effectively irrebuttable presumption of per se legality, and thus antitrust immunity, absent an indication of illegal tying, fraud, or sham litigation. 32 The existence of a patent is taken as a conclusive business justification of a refusal to license or sell.
The divergence between the Appelate Courts has triggered an intense debate. 33 The Kodak-decision is frequently criticized as being out of step with modern antitrust analysis which focuses on objective economic evidence instead of subjective intent. Xerox, on the other hand, is criticized for effectively construing an antitrust immunity for patent and copyright holders -against the widely acknowledged notion that antitrust law and intellectual property law are not inconsistent, but complementary fields of law. 35 Nonetheless, the Department of Justice and the FTC, while rejecting an outright antitrust immunity for unilateral refusals to license, have declared in their recently published report on "Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights" that "[a]ntitrust liability for mere unilateral, unconditional refusals to license patents will not play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust protections", emphasizing that the unilateral right to refuse to license, i.e. the right to exclude, is a core part of the patent grant.
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The DOJ and FTC thereby appear to neglect -at least for the time being -attempts by practitioners and academics to formulate a more differentiated basis for antitrust liability for the unilateral refusal to license or sell that would reach beyond the KodakXerox controversy. Both Kodak and Xerox have recognized that intellectual property rights, and the right of exclusion inherent in them, do not "protect an attempt to extend a lawful monopoly beyond the grant of a patent". 37 Referring to the "grant" or "scope" of the patent in determining the scope for the application of antitrust rules to unilateral refusals to deal is ambiguous. It is sometimes taken to stand for the exclusive use of IP law categories to define a "safe harbor" for unilateral refusals to license in antitrust law. 38 Viewed from a different perspective, the phrase may suggest the application of the "leverage theory" in a manner that takes both IP law rationales and antitrust rationales into account.
39 This is, it seems, the approach that the district court had taken 41 According to these principles, successful antitrust challenges to unilateral refusals to deal will be, and are in fact, rare. Some unilateral refusals to deal are, however, very anticompetitive and damaging. By way of example, Melamed and Stoeppelwerth refer to AT&T's initial refusal to connect MCI to its network. 42 Any kind of antitrust immunity for unilateral refusals to license or sell IPRs would risk to create incentives for firms to immunize its anticompetitive behavior by designing its systems such that access to networks and interfaces are patented, and also to seek to expand the boundaries of the immunity, particularly because the line between simple refusals to deal and other kinds of exclusionary conduct is difficult to draw. 43 Melamed and Stoeppelwerth therefore propose to apply general antitrust rules: IPR owners may enjoy the fruits of their lawfully obtained property, including whatever monopoly profits that property enables them to earn, but they may not sacrifice such profits strategically, by using that property in ways that serve no legitimate purpose (i.e. in ways that neither benefit consumers nor promote efficiency) in order to create additional market power. IPRs do not grant a legal entitlement to extend the IPR owner's power "beyond the intellectual property grant or to create additional market power". 44 Against an approach which gives greater weight to the leveraging doctrine in mediating the IP/antitrust interface: Pate, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 441: "A patent holder can lawfully acquire more than one economic monopoly by exercising the exclusionary power of a single patent, and should not be found liable for exercising its unilateral right to refuse to license or use its invention in the markets where he holds these monopolies. There is no unlawful extension of monopoly power when a patent holder merely exercises its rights inherent in the patent grant". 40 1998 WL 614485, at 15 (DDC Sept. 14, 1998). 41 Mark Patterson has proposed a different approach. He agrees that an IPR entitles the IPR owner to fully reap the profits -including monopoly profits -from its invention. Drawing on the utilitarian rationale of IP law to reward inventions, he argues, however, that IPRs should provide special protection from the antitrust laws only when the owner of the IPR is denying access to the innovation inherent in the intellectual property. 45 No special protection should be granted where an IPR owner refuses to deal with a third party who will not make use of the invention as such, but needs access to IPR-protected parts only to compete in a completely different market -like do ISOs who compete in the services market and request access to the IPR-protected equipment only to install it for the benefit of the equipment owners.
46 And the IPR owner should not be allowed to use the right to exclude inherent in an IPR to leverage market power if he cannot show that it is exactly the legal right -and not distinct economic market conditions -that are the source of the leveraging power he posesses. 47 The debate is still ongoing. Widespread agreement exists among US scholars that purely structural approaches are inadequate to address unilateral refusals to license IPRs. 48 No court has so far qualified IPRs as "essential facilities". 49 The fact that an IPR confers significant market power, or even monopoly power, upon its owner, and that the IPR owner exercises this power by refusing to license or sell, will not suffice to find a violation of Sec. 2 Sherman Act. In Trinko -a non-IP-related case -the US Supreme Court has held that the mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not unlawful "unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct". 50 The general perception is that, where the unilateral exercise of IPRs is at issue, the case for requiring the antitrust plaintiff to cleary specify an element of anticompetitive conduct beyond the mere refusal to license or sell is 45 Patterson, When is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1133, at 1134 (2000). 46 Id., at 1135. 47 Id., at 1156. 48 Against the application of the essential facilities doctrine in the IP context, inter alia:
Hovenkamp/Janis/Lemley, Unilateral Refusals to License in the U.S., Working Paper, April 2005, p. 19 et seq., particularly pp. 23-24: "We believe the better view is that an intellectual property right itself cannot constitute an essential facility, and that the doctrine should not be applied to cases that seek access to an intellectual property right in any but the most unusual circumstances". particularly strong. 51 This notion extends to those cases in which a plaintiff requests access to interface information protected by an IPR.
IV. Controlling unilateral exercises of IPRs in the EU
The European approach towards unilateral refusals to license differs significantly from any of the approaches so far taken by US courts. There are various reasons for the specificities of the European discourse on unilateral refusals to license. First of all, the US and EU competition law rules on single-firm conduct -Sec. 2 Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC -are different rules. 52 Secondly, the difficult interface between IP and competition rules is further complicated in the EU by the fact that, despite important initiatives to harmonize, 53 patent law and copyright law remain essentially national law for the time being. 54 Where US scholars almost uniformly maintain that overbroad IP protections should preferably be addressed by reforming IP law itself, 55 and where US courts call for an interpretation of federal antitrust laws and federal patent and copyright laws in light of each other, the ECJ must apply EU competition law rules against the background of different national IP laws and policies. On the one hand, the EU must respect the different policy choices reflected in national copyright and patent laws. Propositions in the CFI's Magill decision which argued in favor of a delimitation of national IPRs where they were so broadly construed as to be in systemic tension with the EC Treaty's competition and free movement rules were not taken up by the ECJ on appeal (see para. 58 of the ECJ's decision). The CFI had argued that it followed from Art. 30 EC-Treaty that only those restrictions on freedom of competition, free movement of goods or freedom to provide services which were inherent in the protection of the actual substance of the IPR were permitted. I.e. derogations from the fundamental the other hand, EU competition rules must be applied harmoniously across all Member States -and it follows from this latter imperative that national IP laws cannot immunize IP owners from the application of EU competition rules. 57 It is against this background that the ECJ has consistently held that the exclusive rights inherent in IPRs and their exercise, including a refusal to license or sell, cannot in themselves constitute an abuse. 58 However, the exercise of an IPR by a dominant undertaking can involve an abuse given "exceptional circumstances". 59 Like most US courts, the ECJ thus appears to have adopted some kind of "rebuttable presumption" in favor of the legality of refusal to license. In specifying the preconditions for a rebuttal, or for finding "exceptional circumstances", the ECJ has, however, taken a novel approach. It does not require a showing of anticompetitive intent, as the Kodak-court did. Nor does it require a completely separable actionable abuse, like the Xerox-court. The "exceptional circumstances" as developed by the ECJ rather reflect an "essential facility"-rationale, plus an additional requirement that the unilateral refusal to license must prevent the appearance of a new product. The "new product"-requirement is apparently meant to protect an adequate reward for the IP-owner, and thus to mediate between the respect for the underlying rationale of national IP laws and the application of EU competition law. It is, however, questionable whether the "new product"-criterion is adequate to perform this task. In fact, the "new product"-requirement can be criticised both from a competition law point of view as from an IP law point of view.
The ECJ's case law a) General principles regarding refusals to deal and refusals to license
In the EU, like in US law, the freedom to deal or not to deal is a fundamental part of freedom of trade.
60 It extends to all undertakings, including dominant ones. The procompetitive justification for a policy in favor of freedom of contract and the free exercise of property rights has been summarized by AG Jacobs in Bronner (paras. 57): If companies were not allowed to retain their facilities which they have developed for the purpose of their business for their own use, and instead access to production, purchasing or distribution facilities were granted too easily, there would be no incentive freedoms should be admitted only to the extent that it was justified for the purpose of safeguarding those rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of a given type of intellectual property. Also, when applying Art. 82, it should be subject to scrutiny whether an IPR was not being exercised in such ways and circumstances as to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to Art. 82. The possibility to constrain the Member States' discretion through a strict application of Art. 30 -although legally available -has only rarely been used. 57 The Federal Circuit's approach towards unilateral refusals to license in Xerox would therefore not be viable in EU competition law. 58 for competitors to develop competing facilities. An open-access policy would increase competition in the short term, but reduce it in the long term. At the same time, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were to share the benefits. The mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an advantage over a competitor thus cannot justify a duty to deal. Exceptional circumstances must be fulfilled in order to find a refusal to deal to constitute an abuse. Mostly, the ECJ has found an abuse based on a conduct separate from, and in addition to the mere refusal to deal, namely a termination of an existing supply relationship without objective justification, or tying which led to the elimination of competition in a related market. In a limited number of cases, the ECJ has found a refusal to deal itself to constitute an abuse where a company owned or controlled a facility or input which was objectively indispensable to compete on a downstream market, and which was impossible to duplicate, and where the refusal to contract would eliminate competition in the downstream market. 61 In the words of AG Jacobs, a dominant undertaking must have "a genuine stranglehold on the related market" to justify the application of Art. 82 to a "pure" refusal to deal (conclusions in Bronner, para. 65).
The same general principles apply to the refusal to license. Some commentators have suggested that no difference exists, or should exist, between the competition law treatment of refusals to deal with goods or services, and the refusal to license an IPR.
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In Bronner -a non-IPR-related case -the ECJ cited Magill -a refusal to license-caseas a relevant precedent regarding refusals to deal. 63 In refusal-to-license cases, the ECJ has, however, particularly emphasized the necessity to strictly delimit the application of Art. 82 EC, and has pointed to the potential tension with the essence of an IPR -the right to exclude imitation. 64 In two cases that have dealt specifically with refusals to license -Magill and IMS Health -the ECJ has therefore introduced an additional criterion for finding a violation of Art. 82 EC: the "new product"-requirement. 65 The two more recent cases in which the ECJ had to deal with unilateral refusals to licence -Magill and IMS Health -concerned copyrights. Typically, copyrights create less tension with competition than patents since they protect only a particular expression, and not the underlying idea. The fact that the copyrights at issue in the two cases could nonetheless block competition in adjacent markets were due to the fact that in Magill, the copyrighted information was the unique source of information, and in IMS Health the copyrighted brick structure had become a de facto standard in the industry and customers were unwilling to switch. In both cases, the tension between IPR protection and competition was therefore similar to the type of tension that will more typically be found in cases involving patents. It is likely, therefore, that the ECJ would apply similar criteria in cases involving patents. However, the question whether the test for unilateral refusal to license should distinguish between patents, copyrights and trademarks has not been explicitly addressed so far by the ECJ.
b) Magill and IMS Health
In Magill, the ECJ was confronted with a somewhat unusual fact-pattern: 66 Magill TV Guide, Ltd. intended to publish the first comprehensive weekly TV guide for Ireland and Northern Ireland. Although not in the business of publishing comprehensive TV guides themselves, the relevant TV stations refused to license their copyrighted TV listings to Magill. In this situation, the ECJ found the TV channels' refusal to licence to constitute an abuse under Art. 82(b), and based its finding on the following special circumstances: (1) Each of the three TV channels was the only source of the basic information on its own programme scheduling and thus enjoyed a de facto monopoly over the information needed to compile a comprehensive listing for TV programmes (para. 47). Access to this information was indispensable for offering a weekly TV guide (para. 53). (2) The refusal to provide the requested information prevented the appearance of a new product -a comprehensive weekly TV guide -which the TV channels themselves did not offer and for which there was a specific, constant and regular potential consumer demand (para. 52 and 54). (3) By refusing to license the information, the TV channels reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly TV guides and excluded all competition on that market (para. 56). (4) There was no justification for the refusal to license "either in the activity of television broadcasting or in that of publishing television magazines" (para. 55).
Magill initiated an intense debate. One of the most important and controversial questions raised was whether the new product requirement and the exclusion of all competition on a secondary market are alternative or cumulative criteria. This issue was addressed in the ECJ's next decision on unilateral refusals to license: IMS Health.
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IMS, a company engaged in marketing regional sales data on pharmaceutical products in Germany and owner of a copyright in a certain format (so-called brick structure) used for tracking such sales, had refused to licence its copyright to its direct competitor, NCD. The brick structure, consisting of 1860 bricks, where each brick corresponded to a designated geographic area, had been developed by IMS with significant input of the pharmaceutical industry, and had become a de facto industry standard. Different structures for tracking sales were not accepted by clients, since they had adapted their information and distribution systems to the 1860-brick structure and would have faced high switching costs. When NCD used a brick structure based on IMS's 1860-brick structure, IMS sued NCD for violation of its copyright. NCD counterclaimed that IMS's refusal to grant a license to the use of the brick structure constituted an infringement of Art. 82 EC. The Landgericht Frankfurt asked the ECJ to clarify the relevant criteria for determining whether the refusal to licence an IPR can constitute an abuse within the meaning of Art. 82.
The ECJ confirmed the Magill-criteria 68 and held that these criteria must be cumulatively present in order for a refusal to license to constitute an abuse (para. 38 68 The input to which access is requested must be indispensable for taking up economic activity in a secondary market; refusal to license must prevent the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand; the refusal must eliminate all competition in a secondary, market; and there is no objective justification for the refusal.
thus apparently established an extremely high threshold for unilateral refusals to license to fall under Art. 82 EC: not only must a leveraging situation be shown; in addition, the refusal to licence must prevent the appearance of a "new product" and thus limit production as required under Art. 82 lit. b. A refusal to license shall only constitute an abuse "where the undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the owner of the IPR, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand" (para. 49).
At the same time, the ECJ lowered the threshold for finding an abuse by interpreting the preconditions for leveraging leniently. According to the ECJ, it is not necessary to identify the existence of two actual separate markets -a market for the upstream input and a downstream market for which the input is indispensable. The identification of a "potential" or "hypothetical market", i.e. the identification of two different stages of production and an actual demand for the input to engage in an economic activity downstream, shall suffice for the determination of a leveraging scenario.
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Based on these criteria it was for the national courts to decide whether the preconditions for finding the refusal to license to constitute an abuse under Art. 82 EC were fulfilled.
c) Open questions after Magill and IMS Health
Magill and IMS Health have triggered an avalanche of comments. 70 Both the application of a "hypothetical market" concept in the leveraging context and the "new product"-requirement for finding a unilateral refusal to licence to constitute an abuse have been heavily criticised.
The concept of a "hypothetical market" implies that a competitor's demand for access to an input or a production stage which is indispensable for engaging in economic activity 69 "… it is sufficient that a potential market or even hypothetical market can be identified. Such is the case where the products or services are indispensable in order to carry on a particular business and where there is an actual demand for them on the part of undertakings which seek to carry on the business for which they are indispensable" (para. 44). "Accordingly, it is determinative that two different stages of production may be identified and that they are interconnected, inasmuch as the upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream market" (para. 45). 70 downstream, but has never been marketed separately, suffices to consider a unilateral refusal to deal or to license-claim under Art. 82 EC. Implicitly, this idea has been relevant in the liberalisation of network industries where indeed services markets that depended on the use of the network had to be opened up for the first time. Outside the context of the liberalisation of historical monopolies, the fact-pattern is usually a different one: here, a dominant undertaking which owns or controls a de facto standard frequently allows third parties the use of the standard at first but refuses to grant access or license later once a promising secondary market has evolved. The refusal to deal then becomes an instrument of leveraging market power into already existing secondary markets. The concept of a "hypothetical market" is not necessary to cover these cases of leveraging. The special case of historical monopolies aside, the extension of the leveraging scenario to "hypothetical markets" is indeed problematically broad: there is a real danger that competition law will pursue regulatory aspirations instead of protecting a competitive environment in the longer run. 71 The input owner's decision to open or not to open a market at a certain production stage will frequently result from his assessment at what stages of production markets can profitably be developed, and thus follow a legitimate individual profit-maximization rationale. 72 Where the definition of a leveraging situation is solely left to (potential) competitors' demand, the indispensability of the input tends to become the only limiting principle for an input owner's duty to share -a duty which then no longer depends on the business rationality of the input owner's decisions but on structural criteria alone. 73 No less contentious than the concept of a "hypothetical market" is the "new product" requirement. 74 The controversies surrounding its rationale and rationality may be partly due to the fact that it has been applied in very different factual settings. In Magill, the "new product" criterion was important in finding that the preconditions of Art. 82(b) were fulfilled: since the refusal to license impeded the offering of a new product for which there was obvious consumer demand, it led to a limiting of "production, markets 71 See: Mestmäcker, in: Mestmäcker, Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der Europäischen Union, 2 nd ed. p. 767, at 779-780. 72 The relevance of the fact that a dominant company has found it in its interest to supply an input to one or more customers in the past is acknowledged by the EU Commission, Discussion Paper, para. 217. 73 Criticizing the ECJ's "hypothetical market" concept as a basis for leveraging claims does not imply that an input owner cannot be held liable for the refusal to license an IPR which has not been marketed before. or technical development" and resulted in consumer harm. 75 In IMS Health, by contrast, the ECJ used the "new product" requirement in what was essentially a leveraging case. 76 The new product criterion is, however, to some extent at odds with the essence of a typical leveraging claim that the anticompetitive conduct at issue is a means to crowd out competitors on a downstream market, 77 and thus presupposes that direct competitors exist -competitors that offer identical products or close substitutes. The European Microsoft case may be an example. 78 In a leveraging scenario, the logic apparently underlying the "new product"-criterion -namely that IPRs grant protection against imitation for all products or services which the IPR owner has decided to produce, a protection which Art. 82 EC must respect 79 -is unconvincing as a matter both of IP and of competition policy. Patent and copyright law grants protection for inventions, not for business decisions to make use of them in a certain way. To make the scope of the IPRprotection turn on whether the IPR owner has already decided to produce and offer a certain product at the time an access request is made does not fit well with IP law rationales. Competition law, on the other hand, protects even direct competitors against exclusionary abuse. In order to bring both IP and competition law rationales to bear, one might attempt to delineate the "scope of reward" 80 that a given IPRs is meant to protect from the IP law side, and ask to what extent competition for the market remains possible from a competition law perspective. The "new product"-criterion does none of this, or only unsatisfactorily so. It cuts back IP protection where the party requesting access purports to engage in innovation of sufficient size (the rationale of Art. 82 lit.b EC), but denies protection to competition in its own right. It pursues more an innovation than a competition policy rationale.
Considering these serious objections to the "new product" requirement as a principled basis for solving the tension that may, in a broad variety of fact-patterns, arise between IP law and competition policy, IMS Health should be read narrowly: The "new product" requirement in IMS Health can be understood as a necessary precondition for finding an 75 For the relevance of the "new product" requirement in the context of Art. In contrast to the ECJ which has attempted to delimit the application of Art. 82 EC to refusals to deal and to license, the EU Commission has in different contexts favored the implementation of "open access"-policies on the basis of a broadly construed "essential facilities"-doctrine. 84 The Commission further pursues this approach in its Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses ("Discussion Paper"). 85 The Discussion Paper takes the ECJ's case law into account, but in important, though subtle respects it softens the preconditions for finding an abuse under Art. 82. A somewhat laxer definition of the preconditions of an abusive refusal to license and more generally refusals to deal is coupled with the introduction of an open efficiency defence which amounts to an open balancing of interests once the threshold criteria for an abuse are met. Whereas so far the presumption of the case law on refusals to license / refusals to deal has been that the right to freely decide whether and with whom to deal deserves strong protection, under the efficiency defence it is for the dominant company to prove that it deserves a protection of its property rights. 81 Such an interconnection between the concept of the hypothetical market and the new product requirement is insinuated by 82 It remains questionable whether the replacement of the "2-actual-markets"-requirement by the "new product"-requirement is sound as a matter of policy. It allows to pursue refusals to license even in cases where the IPR owner has not voluntarily opened a market for the input before. This may be relevant in some cases where a de facto standard is protected by an IPR. In those situations, the test can be taken as a compromise between allowing access to the standard / interface, but at the same time granting some protection against imitation. The "new product requirement" makes the "scope of reward" that is protected against competition depend entirely on the business decisions which the IPR owner has taken up to the day of the access request -and not on the nature and scope of the IPR at issue and/or competitive effects. Even in those cases where access to a purely hypothetical market is at issue, the "new product" requirement is therefore unsatisfactory. 83 The conduct must be properly characterized as a true refusal to supply; 86 (2) the undertaking refusing to supply must be dominant on a defined market -frequently the upstream input market, 87 but possibly also a distinct market to which access is needed to enter a related market, e.g. a market for interface information; 88 (3) the input requested must be indispensable to carry on normal economic activity in the downstream market. Where a compulsory license to an IPR is sought, it must be impossible for competitors to turn to any workable alternative technology or to "invent around"; (4) the refusal to supply must be likely to have a "negative effect on competition"; and (5) the refusal to supply must not be objectively justified. A refusal to licence an IPR will only be qualified as an abuse if, in addition, it prevents the development of the market for which the licence is an indispensable input, to the detriment of consumers. The "new product requirement" established by the ECJ in Magill and IMS Health is described as flowing from this rationale.
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In formulating the test, the Commission has been visibly concerned with possible applications of Art. 82 in the IT industries, or more broadly in industries characterized by strong network effects. The Discussion Paper stresses that the control over interface information can imply dominance (para. 226) and that access to IPRs will likely be considered indispensable where IPR protected technology has become a standard, or where interoperability with the rightholder's IPR protected product is necessary for a company to enter or remain on the product market (para. 230). Also, the Commission has added a specific section on the refusal to supply interoperability information (9.2.3.) which it apparently regards as a separate category of refusals to deal. While the Commission confirms that there is no general obligation for dominant companies to ensure interoperability, it suggests that the refusal to provide interoperability information shall constitute an abuse where it results in leveraging market power from one market to another. "Even if such information may be considered a trade secret it may not be appropriate to apply to such refusals to supply information the same high standards for interventions" as previously described (para. 242). The Commission does not clarify which of the criteria for finding an abuse in refusal to licence-cases shall be alleviated, and in what way. It appears likely that in such cases the Commission intends to drop the "new product" requirement. 90 The Commission leaves open what standards 86 See Discussion Paper, para. 225. 87 The Commission subscribes to the IMS Health jurisprudence that an actual market for the input need not necessarily exist. It suffices that a potential or even a hypothetical market exists which is created by actual demand for the input (Discussion Paper, para. 227). 88 Discussion Paper, para. 226. 89 Discussion Paper, para. 239. 90 If the new product requirement were replaced by a refined test which would better capture and balance the need to protect IPR ownership and the advantages of allowing for competition in none-core shall apply if the interoperability information is protected not by trade secrets, but by patents or copyrights.
bb) Deviations from the ECJ's case law
Although the Discussion Paper clearly links to, and also cites, the ECJ's jurisprudence in Bronner, Volvo, Magill and IMS Health, it deviates from this case law in important respects.
Instead of requiring an elimination of all competition on the secondary market before a refusal to deal can be held to infringe Art. 82 EC, a "negative effect on competition" shall suffice. 91 With this threshold significantly lowered, the handling of refusal to deal cases then turns on the interpretation of the indispensability requirement. 92 The Discussion Paper gives no particular guidance in this respect.
In stating that a refusal to license will only constitute an abuse if it "prevents the development of the market for which the licence is an indispensable input, to the detriment of consumers", the Commission essentially restates the preconditions of Art. 82(b). It thus links to Magill, where the fact that Magill intended to offer a new product for which there was specific, constant and regular potential consumer demand was an important element of finding a violation of Art. 82. IMS Health is also cited, but only as an example that the intention to offer a new product may be necessary to establish that the refusal to license prevents the development of a market to the consumers' detriment. Clearly, the Commission does not want to exclude other possibilities to show that a refusal to license leads to consumer harm. The Commission's inclination towards a narrow interpretation of the "new product" requirement is made explicit in para. 240, which creates a privilege for access to IPRs for the purpose of follow-on innovation. According to the Commission, "[a] refusal to licence an IPR protected technology which is indispensable as a basis for follow-on innovation by competitors may be abusive even if the licence is not sought to directly incorporate the technology in clearly identifiable new goods and services". A refusal to licence should not impair consumers' ability to benefit from innovation brought about by the dominant undertaking's competitors. 93 The Commission thus alleviates the preconditions for applying Art. 82 to refusals to deal generally, and to refusals to license in particular, in various ways. At the same time, the Commission broadens the scope for possible defences. To the "objective markets, the refusal to supply information needed for interoperability would likely not form a legally separate category as the Discussion Paper currently suggests. 91 The Commission argues that this lower threshold is appropriate because the elimination of one of several competitors by way of refusal to deal might already have a significant detrimental effect, even if other competitors stay in the market. For example, the tendency towards collusion might be strengthened, or a "maverick" firm might be eliminated (Discussion Paper, paras. 231-232). 92 Note, for example, that according to the EU Commission's Microsoft decision, indispensability of the interoperability information was found, despite the fact that competitors could reverse engineer. The reason brought forward by the Commission was one of timing. While the Commission's assessment may well be correct, it shows that the line between indispensability and non-indispensability can be a fine one, and can be charged with policy choices. justifications" which have always been accepted by the ECJ, 94 the Discussion Paper adds a separate and new "efficiency defence" (paras. 235-236). According to the Commission, opening a "efficiency defence" against a presumptively anti-competitive refusal to deal / refusals to license results from the recognition that an indispensable input -be it a raw material, an essential facility or an intellectual property right -often is the result of substantial investments entailing significant risks, and that in order to maintain incentives to invest and innovate, the dominant firm must not be unduly restricted in the exploitation of valuable results of the investment (para. 235). A dominant firm which controls an indispensable input can therefore argue that its refusal to deal / to license is justified by its investments and risks in the specific case, or by the necessity to maintain investment incentives more generally. The Commission proposes to assess the positive and negative effects of imposing a duty to deal, inter alia the negative incentive effects and the possible positive effects on incentives for follow-on investments resulting from allowing access (para. 236). In doing so, it will, inter alia, take into account whether the investments that have led to the creation of the indispensable input would likely have been made even if the investor had known that it would have a duty to supply -for instance where the input was created under a regime of special or exclusive rights, where the investments behind the innovations were not particularly significant, 95 or where the original investment primarily was made for reasons not related to the market in which the company asking access to the input intends to use the input. 96 The Commission contemplates the possibility to grant a dominant firm the right to exclude others from access to the input for a certain period of time", sufficient to ensure an adequate return on the investment (para. 235). Where a compulsory license is imposed, a dominant firm should therefore "normally be free to seek compensation for successful projects that is sufficient to maintain investment incentives, taking the risk of failed projects into account" (para. 235).
It results from this passage in the Discussion Paper that the Commission envisages a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis once the (alleviated) preconditions for an anticompetitive refusal to deal / refusals to license have been established. It follows from the general part of the Discussion Paper, where the new concept of an "efficiency defence" in the context of Art. 82 EC is introduced, that the burden of proof for an objective justification or efficiency defence will be on the dominant company (para. 77). Once the threshold criteria for a presumptively anti-competitive refusal to deal / refusal to license are established, a dominant company shall therefore prove that its facilities or IPRs are the result of substantial investments and risks, that it needs its exclusivity rights and discretion in the choice of trading partners in order to ensure an adequate return on its investment, and ideally that its original investments were primarily made with a view to getting returns in the market in which competitors are now seeking access to the input. It will also have to show that the negative effects on its incentives to 94 invest in R&D in the future, should a compulsory license be imposed, would outweigh possible positive effects on incentives to follow-on investments from allowing access. For the introduction of such an "efficiency defence", the Commission cannot rely on the ECJ's jurisprudence in the context of "refusal to deal". 97 Until now, the ECJ has relied on the incentive function of property rights generally, and IPRs in particular, to justify its restrictive approach towards applying Art. 82 EC to refusals to license / refusals to deal: maintaining incentives and respecting the reward function of IPRs has been the reason to strictly and narrowly construe the preconditions for finding a violation of Art. 82. In introducing the efficiency defence, the Discussion Paper fundamentally reconceptualizes the approach towards refusals to license / refusals to deal. A strong presumption against a duty to license / a duty to deal is turned into a significantly laxer test of abuse at the core of which is the determination of the indispensability of access to an input to compete in a secondary market, and once this threshold is met, an open balancing of interests. Imposing the burden of proof for showing a superior interest in protecting the right to exclude on the dominant firm ensures the competition authorities' and courts broad discretion in imposing "open-access" policies.
b) Evaluation of the Discussion Paper's approach
In developing its position on refusals to license, the Commission was confronted with an uncertain state of law. The Microsoft-case had raised its awareness of the shortcomings of the approach developed by the ECJ in Magill and IMS Health: typical leveraging situations can be difficult to address when applying the IMS Health-criteria; and the current doctrine may not be well-suited to adequately address the variety of access and interoperability problems raised especially in those industries characterized by strong network effects. In light of such new developments and experiences, the Commission has a mandate to provide direction and to pro-actively shape competition policy within the limits drawn by Art. 81 and Art. 82. Nonetheless, the question arises whether the Commission's proposal indeed stays within these limits, and whether it is wise as a matter of policy. The Commission's attempt to de-emphasize the "new product"-requirement outside the "limiting of production"-scenario covered by Art. 82 lit. b and to develop criteria which are open enough to deal with the multitude of new factual situations that might arise clearly deserves support. But the approach proposed by the Commission meets with objections of its own.
The Commission fails to explain the economic basis of the broad presumption in favor of access of competitors to IPRs for the purpose of follow-on innovation which the Commission postulates (para. 240). In practice, the proposed follow-on innovation privilege could well undermine the generally restrictive approach towards refusals to deal / refusals to licence: It does not only abandon the "new product" requirement but can easily make inroads into the indispensability test. It is unclear how the 97 The only indication in this direction are the interim proceedings in Microsoft, where the President of the Court of First Instance has considered it is at least arguable that substantial investments made in order to create an indispensable input, and the significant risks that may have gone along can be considered as an objective justification. The Discussion Paper's proposal to have refusal to deal / refusal to license cases turn on a broad efficiency defence, the essence of which is an open balancing of interests once the indispensability of an input has been shown is, however, questionable. According to the general parts of the Discussion Paper, the proposed efficiency defence is an attempt to transfer Art. 81(3) to the sphere of Art. 82. Once an abuse of a dominant position is presumptively established, it is open to the dominant company to demonstrate that the efficiencies brought about by the relevant conduct outweigh the likely negative effects on competition and are likely to enhance the ability and incentive of the dominant company to act pro-competitively for the benefit of consumers (para. 87). However, the efficiency defence in Art. 81 (3) is based on a different conception of rule and exception compared to Art. 82. Within the scope of Art. 81, an agreement in restraint of competition can be justified by a showing that the efficiencies outweigh the anticompetitive effects. Within the realm of Art. 82, the underlying presumption is and should be that dominant undertakings are allowed to compete on the merits, like nondominant undertakings are. It is for the competition authorities to show that the conduct of a dominant undertaking constitutes an abuse, and not for the dominant undertaking to prove the efficiency of its conduct. Primarily, the efficiency of the dominant firm's conduct has to be considered in defining abuse.
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Furthermore, an analogue application of Art. 81(3) in cases of unilateral refusal to deal / to license must fail because, according to a consistent line of case law, one of the preconditions for finding a "refusal to deal/ license" to constitute an abuse is that the refusal eliminates all competition in a secondary market. This is inconsistent with one of the important preconditions for applying Art. 81(3), namely that "competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned is not eliminated". 99 Also for this reason, the countervailing interests implicated in refusal to deal / refusal to license cases, which the Discussion Paper aptly summarizes, including the potential efficiencies of any refusals to deal / to license, must be taken into account at the level of defining the abuse, not at the level of an efficiency defence. This is particularly true for the investment incentives which the fundamental right to freely decide on one's trading partner protects and which argue for a narrow construction of duties to deal. 98 In British Airways, the ECJ has permitted the consideration of efficiency gains as part of an "objective economic justification" for otherwise potentially abusive rebate schemes (15. The Discussion Paper's approach to relax the requirements for finding an abuse, and then to perform a general balancing of interest within the framework of an efficiency defence, thus appears contrary to existing case-law on Art. 82 EC. It weakens the current presumption in favor of the legality of a refusal to license / to deal. The discretion of those institutions that apply Art. 82 EC to implement open-access policies is enhanced by the shifting of the burden of proof for the efficiency defence to the dominant firms. The Discussion Paper's approach would thus create a risk of a significant number of "false positives" and of the implementation of an overly regulatory approach to industries characterized by network effects. This is of even greater concern in a system where Art. 82 is now to be mainly applied and enforced decentrally, i.e. by national competition authorities and courts.
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The Discussion Paper's approach would confer uncontrollable discretion on competition authorities. The proposed concept of an efficiency defence consisting in a general balancing of effects on innovation and competition presupposes the availability of information and a capacity to predict future developments which -not only as a practical matter, but as a matter of principle -may not exist. "innovation policy rationale" 104 -an attempt to tailor the application of competition law such as to maximize innovation on a case-by-case basis. Considering the complex effects of IPRs on innovation incentives and competition, and the acknowledged difficulties of defining and delimiting IPRs generally, this endeavour appears overambitious. Dominant firms will not be able to discern ex ante whether they are under a duty to licence, or whether they enjoy full freedom of trade.
V.
The transatlantic search for a way ahead
The preceding survey of US antitrust and EU competition law approaches towards refusals to license reveals how daunting a task it remains to moderate the IP/antitrust interface. IP and competition policy may be complementary in principle, but areas of tension remain. In a so far limited number of cases, US courts, the ECJ and the EU Commission have developed different approaches to deal with refusal to licensescenarios. 105 None of them gives definite answers. Both jurisdictions are still in search of an adequate rule. With a view to the disagreement among US scholars and courts regarding an economically sound approach, the FTC and the DOJ have recently resigned themselves to a "wait-and-see"-position: They will not actively pursue refusals to license under the US antitrust laws. 106 In the EU, the application of Art. 82 EC to refusals to license remains relevant. Industries with strong network effects, the growing importance of standards and de-facto standards, resulting needs for access to interface information, and the ubiquitousness of IPRs in these areas ensure that the problem will not disappear.
The various approaches developed so far and the shortcomings they display should not cover up the broad consensus on the level of principles. This consensus, as well as the insights to be gained from the relevant case law and debate give direction to the search for a way ahead. Its largely uncontroversial starting point is the principle that duties to share private property -including intellectual property -must be the exception, rather than the rule. In Trinko, the US Supreme Court has summarized the reasons why mandating firms to share the sources of their advantage with rivals is generally in tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law:
107 the duty to share may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in economically beneficial facilities; enforced sharing requires antitrust courts to act as "central planners" -a role for which they are badly qualified; and compelling negotiations between competitors may faciliate collusion -the "supreme evil of antitrust". These reasons caution against broad antitrust doctrines that assume duties to share. In addressing cases that implicate a duty to license, it should first be examined whether the dominant undertaking has engaged in a kind of anticompetitive conduct that is separable from the refusal to deal 108 -even if a duty to license may in the end be the remedy. In such cases, no fundamental tension between competition law and the protection of IPRs exists.
As far as "pure" refusal-to-deal cases are concerned, there is some debate on whether the presumption against duties to share should be stronger where access to IPRs is involved; to what extent this presumption should be relaxed or abandoned where IPRs are an essential input for follow-on innovation or protect interfaces the use of which is indispensable to access ancillary markets; or whether tangible property and intellectual property should simply be treated alike. 109 On the one hand, the protection of all property rights against duties to share serves the important purpose to protect incentives to invest and innovate both by the property owner and by competitors. On the other hand, there are important differences between tangible property and intellectual property. 110 Whereas the content and scope of rights to physical property is to some extent predetermined by the nature of the object, content and scope of IPRs have to be, and are, defined by law. Frequently, the precise determination of an IPR's scope is a matter of interpretation. The uncertainties regarding the boundaries of IPRs are a major cause of the difficulties inherent in the IP-antitrust interface. The right to exclude is the core of IPRs. Legal duties to license affect the essence of an IPR. In this respect, IPRs appear to justify particular protection against antitrust interference. While IPRs do not automatically, and not even typically, confer monopoly power, they do so more frequently than physical property. And where there are no good substitutes for an IPR, full protection of the right to exclude may technically enable the IPR owner to monopolize not one, but various markets. The goal of competition law to keep access to markets open may be compromised.
According to a strong view in the US, antitrust law should take these specificities of IPRs into account by strictly enforcing the limits of IPRs that follow from IP law itself: the IPR owner must accept that full force is given to any exceptions to the right to exclude that follow from the misuse doctrine, fair use exceptions etc. Any attempt to restrain the force of these exceptions may not only violate IP law, but may also be interpreted as an attempt to extend the IPR "beyond the scope" of the IPR and thus leverage monopoly power in violation of Sec. 2 Sherman Act. 111 Under this approach, it is first and foremost the task of IP law to draw the line between protection of innovation and protection of competition. The problem of access to standards, 112 indispensable interface information and the use of IPRs for the purpose of follow-on innovation should then be solved by IP law. While this approach has much to recommend itself, 113 it is not fully applicable in the EU where IP law remains national and must respect the supremacy of the EU competition rules which must be applied uniformly in all Member States. Nonetheless, this approach is not without relevance in the EU: where general legal principles common to the Member States can be discerned, they can be given weight in mediating the IP/antitrust interface.
There are proposals to apply the general test for anticompetitive single-firm conduct, namely whether the refusal to license can be interpreted as a rational profit-maximizing conduct, or whether profits are sacrificed strategically in order to create additional market power. 114 The test does not explain to what extent and in what ways the specificities of IPRs and their underlying policy rationales will be taken into account. The need to interpret competition law and IP law in light of each other and to refer to their policy rationales to resolve the latent tension between the two regimes has been the conceptual starting point of the US Court of Appeals (1 st Circuit) in Data General. Underlying the "new product" requirement in IMS Health may be a similar attempt. 115 This applies as well to the EU Commission's approach in its Discussion Paper.
A number of US and European scholars have taken up this thread and developed it into different directions. 116 In Europe, the challenge in unilateral refusal to license cases has been said to lie in defining the "scope of reward" that a given IPR protects. 117 The major goal of this inquiry -as Hanns Ullrich has noted -"is to safeguard the incentive and reward rationales of intellectual property protection while at the same time controlling the risks of an undue extension of legal exclusivity". 118 New theories of abuse beyond the leveraging theory and the essential facilities theory are to be based on the identifaction of the effects of a refusal to license on competition by substitution and competition by imitation in a given market. 119 In the US, Mark Patterson assumes that granting a degree of market power or even monopoly power is part of the reward rationale underlying IPRs. 120 However, he carefully delimits this rationale: an IPR owner should be entitled only to those gains that result from the technological superiority of its invention, and should therefore have a right to exclude where a third party strives to use an IPR, or a product protected by IPRs, in order to appropriate the added value that results from the protected invention as such. A duty to license should exist, on the other hand, where access to an IPR is requested not in order to appropriate the merits of the invention, but merely because, due to certain market circumstances, like strong network effects and/or the existence of a de facto standard, access is indispensable in order to be able to compete. Patterson thus proposes to inquire in each case into the reasons why access to an IPR is sought.
intervention is justified, guidance can be taken from the first two of the three criteria used in the telecommunications sector to decide when regulation is justified: there must be high, non-transitory barriers to entry; and the market must not tend towards competition in the medium term.
126 Any more broadly conceived bias for protecting competition in the market may create overly regulatory tendencies and risk to turn IPRs into public utilities.
